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Abstracts

EMILIO GIN, Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940

Further expanding an analysis previously made by the same author, this essay addresses the nine months of Mussolini's «non-belligerency» and adds new evidence on the factors that influenced Mussolini's decision to join Hitler in the war on 10 June 1940. In particular, the article provides an insight into the efforts made by Mussolini to differentiate his position from that of Germany and to validate himself as a reliable mediator for peace negotiations. Having failed to achieve this during the first half of the non-belligerency, Mussolini apparently reverted to a policy of solidarity with Berlin. Then, as defeat loomed for the Allies, Mussolini's pressure increased along with German successes until he thought of the declaration of war as a last resort to embolden the peacemakers in Paris and London and to bring them to the peace table to save what remained of the European balance.

Keywords:

Mussolini's «non-belligerency» Peace negotiations, 1939-40 World War Two