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## Abstracts

FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO, Eden, la guerra italo-etiopica e il *test case*

Mussolini decided to open the Ethiopian question in January 1935, following the Laval-Mussolini Agreement. He did not plan to conquer the whole of Ethiopia with a war, but rather aimed to acquiring direct control over part of its territories, as envisaged in the tripartite treaty of 1906, and at imposing a protectorate or a mandate over the remaining independent central area, as the liberal governments of Italy had attempted to do with the treaty of Uccialli. These objectives were to be achieved by means of an agreement with Great Britain. The British government, however, decided to oppose the disruption of Ethiopia, on the grounds that to oppose such policy was essential to the credibility of the League and in order to maintain security in Europe. Anthony Eden had a fundamental role in proposing and in executing such policy. However, the article argues that by doing so, Eden relied optimistically on the deterrent effect that Britain's opposition would have had, he did not anticipate Mussolini's decision to proceed notwithstanding such opposition and he did not plan on the consequences of the failure of a purely verbal opposition. The opposition itself, being based on financial sanctions, but «short of war», was fruitless. On the other hand, in order to give strength to Britain's opposition, Eden wanted to secure France's support, both at the League and in the form of military cooperation in case Britain had to go to war with Italy. Such action, ultimately, broke the Franco-Italian friendship, destroyed the so-called «Stresa Front» and did not succeed in preventing the conquest of Ethiopia.